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An Extended Interview for the EPO* 
 
Has there been an historic defining incident or event that has been especially 
influential in shaping the way that patents are perceived and managed today? 
Two defining events that took place a quarter century ago had a   powerful formative 
effect by broadening of the sphere of patent protection so that it came to apply in key 
emerging areas of technology and new business enterprise.  I’m referring here to the 
pair of watershed rulings handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court:  in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty (1980), a case regarding the patentability of a “new, human-made 
single-celled organism” –namely a bacterium that ate oil slick; and in Diamond vs. 
Diehr (1981), which affirmed the patentability of a mathematical algorithm that 
produced a “technical effect in a machine.”  In 1985 the first of these decisions was 
generalized by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals as holding 
equally for multi-celled organisms, and was soon followed by the award in 1988 of 
the first patent for a genetically modified animal: Harvard’s “OncoMouse.”  It took 
rather longer for the precedent created by the Supreme Court’s ruling on Diehr’s 
algorithm to be extended, but in 1994 the patentability a software program running 
on a general-purpose computer was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of the Federal 
Circuit in Re Alappat (33 F.3
rd 1526).   
Those two decisions were transformative in many respects, some of which were 
obviously positive in their economic effects. But, as the positive usually is 
emphasized, I should perhaps remark first on one of the less happy consequences.  
These legal decisions opened up patenting activity in two fields in which the USPTO 
had virtually no previous experience Clearly, in the areas of genetically modified 
living organisms and software, the patent office in the U.S., like patent offices 
elsewhere, had little patented prior art. This left examiners ill-equipped to make 
judgements about key issues such as the extent of novelty, the extent of 
_____________________________________________ 
* This text is based upon material originating in an extended interview with the author conducted by 
Shirin Elahi, in Oxford on 28 April 2005, for the “Scenarios Project” of the European Patent Office – a 
book entitled Interviews for the Future, forthcoming from EPO in Summer 2006. The views expressed 
do not represent those of the EPO, or, indeed, any of the institutions with which the author is 
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obviousness,  and the issue of defining a utility in an economically and socially 
meaningful fashion. The result was the award of many patents that should not have 
been granted, which called into question the technical competence of more than one 
national patent office.  But, perhaps more worrisomely, this gave the holders of un-
warranted patent rights an ability to threaten to obstruct the enterprises of others by 
bringing infringement suits, and so to press for payments that were in effect a “tax” 
on on-going technological innovation-based business. (There is an obvious parallel 
in the much more recent Appeals Court decision on the patentability of “business 
methods” in State Street Bank and Trust vs. Signature Financial Group, Inc. (149 F. 
3d 1525 (Fed.Cir. 1998), but is rather too recent for me to venture to comment on the 
consequences.) 
But, the world of business and finance was not so unprepared to respond to the 
newly-declared patentability of inventions in these fields, which thus created a 
powerful set of economic incentives for the launching of new start-up businesses, 
fuelled by venture capitalists betting on the new science. This was particularly the 
case in biotechnology, where an investment boom that was already underway in the 
1970’s –sparked by the 1973 patent application for the restriction enzyme (“gene 
splicing”) technique invented by Cohen and Boyer – gained greater impetus from the 
ensuing wave of patents on genetically modified organisms. Financiers have the 
view that patents are important, perhaps based in large part on the long experience 
of the pharmaceutical industry. There are only a few industries where patents have 
been historically as important as in chemicals, fine chemicals and pharmaceutical 
industries, where the link between the chemical entity and the product is a short one. 
The more general situation, however, is one in which new applied, commercially 
relevant research rests upon the availability of tools and research techniques, rather 
than the synthesis of a molecule that gives you a new product.  Of course, in the 
case of pharmaceuticals, there is the question of establishing that its effects are not 
injurious, as well as being beneficial for the user, and that is a distinct clinical trial 
process which often is very costly. In the U.S. legislation was passed to extend the 
life of drug patents, to compensate firms for the time consumed during these 
expensive clinical trials.  But that is not the only way that the problem might be 
addressed. Inasmuch as clinical testing has two main purposes, one to establish 
efficacy and appropriate application (dosage) of the new drug, and the other to 
protect the public who use it from harmful effects, it could be argued that the second 
of these is really a public health matter that might well qualify for independent, public 
supervision and financing from public funds – contingent on the product being 
approved by the regulatory authority (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration, in the 
U.S.). Then, in compensation for the public funding, it would be appropriate to 
mandate compulsory licensing of the tested and approved products and/or reduce 
the term of patent protection by rescinding the special legislation that extended in 
case of pharmaceutical products. This proposal would not be very popular with the 
drug companies, but that is not a sufficient reason for it not to be considered.  
Granting a longer monopoly for exploitation of the inventive step is, undeniably, an 
administratively more convenient way to induce private investors to finance the 
“testing” process. But it has drawbacks. Because the tests are then a private 
research activity, supervision and publication of the data often will be incomplete. 
Furthermore, since the basic molecular “inventions” often are tools that have other 
uses, granting patents for these imposes a “tax” on further research and 
technological development.  In addition, in the biomedical field, patents have been   - 3 -
granted on “tests” for the presence of specific molecular structures, which have 
made possible the monopolization of some diagnostic kits, and the consequent 
imposition of very high prices on the diagnostic testing. 
 
Q.: Apart from the application of the patent system into new fields, do you see 
other changes having taken place in recent years? 
The patent regime has acquired a life of its own, independent of the system’s original 
purpose, namely the encouragement of invention and the public revelation of novel 
and useful products and means of production.  Patents traditionally have provided a 
template for other inventors, by disclosing the idea and stimulating the creation of 
alternative ways to achieve its technical effects, and further elaboration on the basic 
invention.  Simply showing that a particular addition to the state of the arts was 
feasible often proves to be an effective goad to the ingenuity of other inventors. In 
this way, the system not only tended to promote technological progress, but did 
away with the wastage of resources involved in the rediscovery of knowledge that 
had already been gained.   
The whole idea of the patent system as an information system is terribly important 
because its implementation provides information resource to individual inventors, 
and supports a cumulative feedback process generating novel technological systems 
by the recombination of available constituent elements. But, it is not exploited as fully 
as it might be. Unfortunately, not all the world’s patent offices have embraced this 
aspect of the patent system and undertaken to make the information contained in 
their patent files as readily accessible as the USPTO and the EPO patent databases. 
In a globalised world with Internet communications, it is remarkable that WIPO has 
not made it a priority to seek universal publication of the work of national patent 
offices, and to encourage them to harmonize their information procedures and 
render this mass of data more readily accessible in federated databases. Rather, 
WIPO has construed its mission as one of promoting the harmonizing of patent laws 
across national jurisdictions, a process that almost invariably turns out to raise the 
level of protection globally—since no negotiator for a sovereign state is likely to 
surrender a right that its citizens (and corporations) already hold.  
Interestingly, the technical possibilities of digitized information processing and online 
access of material contained in patents have combined to create a new opportunity 
that some companies in the U.S. and elsewhere are exploiting: inferring the focus of 
the R&D activities of business competitors, or of potential competitors from a 
knowledge of which inventors are assigning patents to the companies in question. 
The patent data and journal publication archives provide a basis for creating profiles 
of the specific research capabilities of the inventors currently employed by a firm and 
from the grouping of individual specialities it is reasonable to draw some inferences 
about the direction and extent of the investment being committed to particular 
research trajectories. In this way, the increased availability of patent-derived 
information about human resources has become a legal alternative to industrial 
espionage. This development reflects just another aspect of the broader shift toward 
indirect uses of patents for competitive business objectives that are primarily 
strategic – guiding firms’ investments away from areas where rivals appear to have 
already to have established an R&D lead, discouraging rivals from attempts to 
penetrate one’s existing market niches, or raising a rival’s costs by bringing suit for 
infringement of one’s own patents..    - 4 -
Indeed, in some industrial fields the rapidly growing volume of patenting in recent 
years reflects the rise in the use of patents as strategic tools in business competition, 
not as a source of information about inventive possibilities, and not even as a means 
of reducing the uncertainty of investing in creating new, commercially applicable 
knowledge through science and engineering research.  The impetus for this 
increasing resort to patenting is not the opening of a richer technical field for 
innovation. Rather, the impulse is a defensive one – protecting existing market 
position and profit streams by threatening potential entrants to one’s profitable lines 
of business, raising existing rivals’ costs by forcing them into expensive litigation, 
and protecting oneself against such threats by acquiring a patent portfolio that 
represents an apparent “retaliatory capability.”  These offensive and counter-
offensive strategic deployments of monopoly rights granted under the patent system 
are interlocked and mutually reinforcing, inasmuch as the expectations of attack (and 
retaliation) induces defensive investments.  
Thus, in those branches of industry such as the manufacture of semiconductors and 
microelectronic equipment – where the pace of technical advances have been 
spectacular and product cycles typically are short –  patenting in former times had  
played almost no role in allowing firms to appropriate the benefits of invention and 
product innovation.  Yet, even there, patents have come to be used as a means of 
capturing super-normal profits and protecting economic “rents”. In the 1980s 
developments in Japan of manufacturing capacity in random access memory chips 
led American companies (IBM, Bell Laboratories, Texas Instruments) to the 
discovery that they had valuable unused assets in their inventories of patents - they 
were major producers of chips although they didn’t sell them, but they had obtained 
patents as part of the process of managing R&D activities (sometimes, it was said, 
because engineers “wanted the patents on their CVs”.)  On the basis of these 
accumulated “patent portfolio” infringement suits were filed against Japanese 
companies, and some large settlements were won. 
Although previously not a part of the standard repertoire of American business 
competition, these R&D-intensive firms soon enjoyed the benefits of this way of 
exploiting their intellectual property assets; and other firms in the affected industry 
came to recognize that avoiding infringement suits – whether by avoiding entry into 
established product niches, or by taking out patent licenses – was the better part of 
business discretion. The threat of patent infringement suits is an especially potent 
one to deploy against rivals in lines of business characterised by high-fixed cost 
manufacturing operations: infringement suits, or even talk of being such actions, 
raises the spectre of court injunctions that can shut down production lines and 
thereby inflict substantial (non-) operating losses. The severity of the threat, 
however, can be mitigated if the targeted firm has undertaken prior investments in 
building up its’ own patents, creating a base from which to file suits in retaliation. The 
role of this mechanism in driving a self-reinforcing cycle of patenting has been well 
analyzed and carefully documented by economists. In their research on the U.S. 
semiconductor industry, economists Bronwyn Hall and Rebecca Ziedonis,
1  found 
that patent portfolios began to grow rapidly during the 1980s not as the result of 
increased investment in R&D to take advantage of new inventive opportunities, but 
as part of the firms’ self-protection strategy for patent trading and cross-licensing. 
                                            
1 B.H. Hall and R. Ziedonis, "The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US 
Semiconductor Industry, 1979-95”,  The RAND Journal, 32(1), 2001p 101-128   - 5 -
Patents in this industry were found to have a new set of uses that were unrelated to 
innovation, and which diffused among the firms in a self-reinforcing strategic 
dynamic. This was the emergence of a proto-typical “patent arms race,” which, 
symptomatically, came to replace the race to be first to enter the market and gain the 
first-mover advantages of lower production costs by travelling down the learning 
curve; emblematically, it was a far cry from the idea of the “patent race” in which rival 
firms sought to pre-empt a dominant market position by being first to invent. One 
consequence of this transformation has been the epiphenomenal rise patent 
portfolio-building through the negotiation of purchase and cross-licensing 
agreements, rather than by means of R&D investments; and the exploitation of those 
portfolios, not in production and marketing of new goods, but through intellectual 
property licensing agreements.  In the process, as one may imagine, budgets for 
legal services tend to expand at the expense of those for research laboratories and 
personnel.   
Encouraged by a sea-change in the disposition of the courts, which came to favour 
plaintiffs in patent infringement suits more markedly after 1979 in the U.S. -- when 
the Appeals Court of the Federal Circuit was formed as a specialised venue for 
patent litigation, the patent regime has thus moved from the encouragement of 
inventive activity to the protection of exploitative activity. In some branches of 
industry this tendency has been evident for quite a long time, and its economic 
foundations are more immediately visible. In the pharmaceutical industry, as a prime 
example, research costs are 20% of the overall R&D costs, and the bulk of the other 
80%, the “ development” part of R&D are spent on very costly and often extended 
clinical trials. In the interest of recouping these large, fixed expenditures, the 
industry’s business strategy has moved to the marketing of a small number of billion 
dollar drug therapies. That is just the beginning, however, because pharmaceutical 
companies today spend more for advertising to build markets for these “major” 
prescription drug products than on research. As well as advertising designed to 
prompt prospective patients to “ask the doctor” about particular newly available 
medications, considerable creativity is devoted to providing prescribing physicians 
with persuasive “product information” at subsidized and tax-deductible conferences 
and seminars held at exotic vacation resorts; it was recently reported in the New 
York Times that the most preferred demographic and educational qualifications for 
winning employment with drug companies as a sales representative visiting doctors’ 
offices in the U.S. is: “female, former college cheer-leader.”  
Having sunk enormous sums in the distribution channels for a patented “block-
buster” pharmaceutical product, there is a correspondingly great incentive for the 
company to use whatever strategy will maintain its revenue-generating capacity as 
long as possible.  Consequently, it is observed with increasing frequency that the 
economic lives of drug patents are being extended by marketing the product for uses 
not approved originally (so-called “off-license” use) – in other words, finding a new 
array of “utilities” for existing drugs as the end of the original patent’s life 
approaches.  The renewal of the patent for novel purposes, even when the latter do 
not themselves generate substantial revenues, has a dual effect, the other half of 
which has been found to be particularly lucrative in the case of drugs for chronic 
conditions like stomach ulcers, and hypertension: with the item still in the company’s 
distribution channels, the sales force can continue persuading doctors to go on 
prescribing it to patients who have been taking the drug, rather than letting them 
switch to a much less expensive but unfamiliar generic product.     - 6 -
 
Today we have the possibility of creating new things by recombining existing goods 
and services for the use of customers who can take an active role as creative agents 
as well consumers of the final commodity.  Yet, the recent thrust of the intellectual 
property regime is to stop this – to leave the end-user in the situation of a passive 
customer whose option is to buy the product or service, or not, at the price at which it 
is offered to her.  In the fields covered by copyright especially, the trend is toward 
having everything, down to the byte and bit owned and watermarked, instead of 
allowing elements of texts, sounds and images to be capable of continual refinement 
and re-mixing in new creative combinations that suit the special requirements, or 
tastes of the purchaser.  The emerging rental service model in the film and sound 
recording industries seems based upon the view that customers should be kept from 
being producers of cultural goods – and, indeed, incumbent vendors must worry that 
they the new technologies have created many potential entrants who can by-pass 
the existing hierarchically controlled channels of distribution and reach the market – 
themselves and their peers – much more directly and at lower unit costs.  The 
potentially disruptive effects of the digital information technology revolution has thus 
imparted a powerful impetus to the contemporary movement for stronger and more 
comprehensive legal protections for intellectual property in all its forms, and for more 
draconian measure to enforce the rights of intellectual property owners.  
This institutional gambit for protecting the profitability of existing lines of business 
against the effects of “creative destruction” at the hands of entrants equipped, as 
never before, to engage in competing lines of business, paradoxically, casts the 
intellectual property regime in a role inimical to the inventive and innovative process.  
In the view of some observers and critics of these developments, perhaps most 
notably Stanford law professor Lawrence Lessig, the campaigns for stiffer 
enforcement measures to protect the rights of intellectual property owners is being 
carried to extremes that may well ignite popular disaffection for the whole property 
regime. The argument of Lessig’s 2004 book, Free Culture, focused upon the efforts 
of the major media firms in the motion picture and recorded music industries, to 
enforce copyright protection in ways that vitiate the potentialities for digitally encoded 
images and sound to be re-used creatively, by an emerging “re-mix culture.” But, 
Lessig’s important critique of the direction in which the copyright regime has been 
evolving really is much broader in its relevance: it raises issues about the perverse 
effects that the wider movement towards a regime of more comprehensive and 
stronger IPR protections – in the area of patents, and database rights as well -- may 
have on the conduct of scientific research. The implications of the latter go well 
beyond the effects of the struggle to protect the rents of the entertainment media 
companies upon the vitality of cultural production. The “collateral damage” that 
misguided and over-zealous “intellectual property rights protectors” in the 
legislatures and courts may already be inflicting the domain of research affecting the 
advancement of science and technology seems to me to have become a matter for 
serious concern. So many aspects of modern societies depend now, and for the 
future, upon the long term vitality of science, engineering and medical research – in 
which open access to data and information and the recombination of ideas and tools 
is critical – that this consideration might be carefully weighed against the social gains 
to be achieved by successfully suppressing sales of pirated DVD’s and unauthorized 
peer-to-peer sharing of music files.    - 7 -
 Therefore, I believe that interjecting these remarks about the present day 
campaigns of the RIAA and allied business associations enforce the legal monopoly 
awarded by copyright is not really an extraneous digression from subjects with which 
the EPO should be concerned. There is a quite direct connection to the question of 
the future evolution of the patent regime, which may be seen in the issue 
surrounding the patentability of computer programs, a policy question that recently 
has stirred intense debate in Europe. As I suggested, earlier, one of the watershed 
events in the development of the patent system during latter half of the twentieth 
century was the precedent that the U.S. Supreme Court set in 1981 by upholding the 
awarding of patent protection to algorithms that produce “a technical effect in a 
machine.” Even though other industrialized countries did not rush to follow the 1994 
U.S. Patent Office Board of Appeals’ affirmation of the patentability software for 
general purpose computers, the legal formula employed by the Court’s ruling in 
Diamond v. Diehr has been embraced more widely, even by national patent offices in 
Europe and the EPO that have been issuing de facto software patents under the 
rubric of “computer-implemented inventions.”  There is every reason to suppose that 
this practice will not be altered in the wake of the European Parliament’s recent 
rejection of an effort by the European Commission to promulgate a software patent 
directive that would have codified (and in some measure harmonized) these national 
policies and practices throughout the EU.  
To properly appreciate the potential consequences of this for continued advances in 
software, a technological field upon which modern society is becoming increasingly 
dependent, it must be recognized that the characteristics of the innovation process 
affecting computer software are polar opposites of those that hold in the case of 
integral inventions such new chemical entities; they are more akin to the “re-mix 
culture” of digital music, or the recombination of shared ideas and techniques in 
“open science” research. Software systems typically exemplify the creation of 
complex functionalities through a process of technological innovation that is 
incremental  and cumulative; with novel “technical effects” achieved through the 
recombination of numerous existing sub-component inventions—namely computer 
sub-routines.  The latter process implies an extraordinarily degree of complementary 
among inventive contributions, and this is reflected in the emphasis that best practice 
software engineering has come to place upon modularity in software system 
architecture. These special attributes of software – and others that derive from the 
fine granularity of the digitally encoded components of these “machines implemented 
as text” -- are in considerable measure shared with a broader class of digital 
information goods. Their existence challenges the validity of presuming that because 
patents are effective in encouraging inventive activities elsewhere, their use should 
be more widely extended into this domain.  
 
Indeed, the opposite is closer to the truth. Distributing patent rights involving many 
complementary programming tools among many different inventors (or first 
claimants), is a recipe for greatly encumbering software developers with the costs 
both in time and legal expenses of conducting patent searches and negotiating 
multiple licenses; otherwise, it would leave them and the users of their software 
products exposed to the significant economic risks of infringement suits and 
injunctive relief. This point was forcefully underscored by Professor Donald Knuth, a 
pioneer in the field of computer programming languages, in a letter he addressed to 
the U.S. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in 1994 following the Patent   - 8 -




 “… I developed software called TeX that is now used to produce more than 90% of 
all books and journals in mathematics and physics and to produce hundreds of 
thousands of technical reports in all scientific disciplines.  If software patents had 
been commonplace in 1980, I would not have been able to create such a system, nor 
would I probably have ever thought of doing it, nor can I imagine anyone else doing 
so…. When I think of the computer programs I require daily to get my own work 
done, I cannot help but realize that none of them would exist today if software 
patents had been prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s.” 
 
The open source movement has demonstrated the feasibility of mobilising resources 
and sustaining cooperative production and distribution of new, large and complex 
software systems by utilising the rights granted copyright owners to license their 
creations on terms and conditions such as those of the GNU General Public License. 
But those engaging in this mode of producing information-goods are likely to be 
caught in immobilising “patent thickets.” Europe’s commercial software developers, 
facing the same prospects can be expected to become drawn into a cycle of 
defensive patenting and patent portfolio acquisition, a process much the same as 
that which overtook the semi-conductor industry. Thus, an effort to emulate the “anti-
piracy” campaign of the media companies against unauthorized copying and sharing 
of digital content (by stiffening the enforcement of existing and future software 
patents covering widely used algorithms) is likely to be especially injurious to the 
continued success of Europe’s smaller commercial software producers.  It also will 
be damaging for “free and open source software” developers, for he rapidly growing 
businesses based upon their “libre” software packages, and for the broader swath of 
industrial users of “embedded Linux” devices.    
 
Is this just an alarmist, nightmare scenario?  Aren’t the owners of software patent 
portfolios unlikely to use them in emulation the exploitative large media companies’ 
anti-piracy campaign? The recent support from industrial firms in the 
telecommunications equipment field for an EU directive on software patents (which 
would have wider application than the 25 members, by affecting the policies of the 
many potential “accession” states) appears to be related to visions of the commercial 
future resembles those which now animate the film and music industry associations’ 
“war” on IP piracy. One of the “futures” envisaged in this field is an eventual 
discontinuation of the sale of digital information appliances for downloading free 
content, and of information goods that are fixed in tangible (and readily copied and 
reproduced) media; what would replace those businesses is the marketing of 
encrypted information services that consumers could access under rental contracts, 
but would be physically prevented from copying for redistribution or modifying and 
manipulating for their own use. If it is technically feasible to implement in the case of 
                                            
2 Letter from Donald E. Knuth to Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, USPTO, February 1994. 
The full text of this letter is reproduced as an addendum to P. A. David, D. Foray, B. H. Hall, B. Kahin, 
and W. E. Steinmueller, “Is there really a sound economic rationale for the proposed EU Directive on 
Software Patents?: A Response to the Report of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 
and the Internal Market on the proposed Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
regarding the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions,
 “ July 14, 2003. Available at: 
http://www.researchineurope/review/draft.htm. 
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digital images and sound, that business model would be equally applicable to a 
wider variety of Internet based services, including word-processing, spreadsheet and 
graphics programs.  Offering these as variably priced services to identifiable 
customers who would access them by means of “trusted” by mobile telephones, 
PDAs, I-Pod-like devices, and laptop and desktop computers, presents attractive 
profit prospects – not least because if would facilitate rather sophisticated forms of 
price discrimination by the owners of patent monopolies. 
 Software is the key to implementing such systems, but software copyrights will not 
protect the idea of the computer programs (including the programs embedded in the 
chips for the hardware devices), only the specific expression of the idea in the code. 
An interest in extending the patentability of software globally thus flows from the 
obvious desirability – from the vantage point of the would-be vendors of such 
services – of establishing a universally strong regime of patent protection for the 
technical ideas that can be held to define the specific nature of the global distributed 
digital information services that they eventually bring to market. In short, the 
underlying rationale is not so much that of further augmenting the incentives for 
investment in new technologies that would deliver these novel services. Instead, it is 
the erection of more effective legal means of increasing their sustained profitability 
by blocking future entry by competitive service providers – including those who might 
be furnished with alternative, open source software technologies. Why wouldn’t 
patent owners make common cause with the big copyright-holders in order to equip 
themselves with more powerful weapons to deploy against infringers of their property 
right?          
  
Q.: What do you see to be key factors that will influence the way the patent and 
IPR regime might unfold over the next twenty years?  
To speak of the unfolding of “the IPR regime” it would be necessary to say 
something about the prospects for global harmonisation of patent statutes, of 
international commitments to greater uniformity of enforcement on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, of reforms of the TRIPs agreement that would codify simpler 
and less costly procedures under which individual countries could invoke compulsory 
licensing powers to address the pressing needs of their respective populations. 
These are really complicated processes that are driven by the political economy of 
international trade and domestic agricultural subsidies, as well as by intricate issues 
arising in the law of international conventions and treaties; obviously the outcomes 
will turn upon the alignment of political and economic power that can be brought to 
bear on specific issues at particular junctures in time, by various national 
governments and multinational corporate groups, each having their own agenda. 
Although these are not subjects about which I would have any particular claim to 
possess insights or expertise, it does strike me as wildly optimistic to suppose that 
the course of institutional and political changes in the foreseeable future will reflect – 
any more than it has in the past – a collective willingness of the contending parties to 
accept specific reforms on the grounds that they are the ones most conducive to an 
economically more efficient use of the world’s resources, or because they would lead 
toward a more equitable global distribution of income and wealth.   So, I will be more 
comfortable directing  my comments to a much narrower question, one that concerns 
the way that prospective developments in the intellectual property rights regime may   - 10 -
affect the global production of public goods in the form of reliable scientific and 
technical information.   
New and exciting capabilities for sharing information and collaborating in the pursuit 
of scientific understanding and cultural creativity have been emerging, and are 
expected to continue to flow from advances in information and computer-mediated 
telecommunications technologies.  The question of the extent to which the 
potentialities of those technical breakthroughs will be utilized by scientific and 
engineering research communities is narrower than some of the issues upon which 
the foregoing discussion has touched, but it is not easier to answer on that account. 
Indeed, the future course of the co-evolution of intellectual property institutions and 
information technologies useful for the generation of new knowledge is presently 
very uncertain. We seem to be poised at a particular juncture, where policy 
developments may go in either of two very different directions: either towards a 
regime of global “intellectual capitalism” featuring more complete and more strongly 
enforced control for the purposes of profit-driven private exploitation of digital 
information assets, or, alternatively towards increasing openness and sharing of 
benefits of the “public goods” properties of information that can be accessed, 
transformed and distributed using new, more technical means. 
A brief tour d’horizon might therefore be found useful in highlighting some of the 
main cross-currents and tensions that make the course of “the patent regime’s 
unfolding” in this regard as hard to forecast as it is important.  In Europe the omens 
for the future seem to point firmly in opposing directions. On the one hand, there 
appear to be clear signs of hesitation, if not of outright resistance on the part of the 
EU to follow the U.S. lead in issuing software patents (even where such might be 
effected by regularizing the award of patents the imprecisely delimited category of 
“computer-implemented inventions”); or into the patenting of business models that 
are not implemented by computer-implemented technical devises. But, on the other 
hand, the unabated drive for ever-stronger measures of IPR enforcement, suggests 
that policy commitment to an extreme form of “intellectual capitalism” is well 
entrenched in some circles in the UK and other EU member states and has found 
ardent champions within the European Commission. 
To take a concrete case in point, the EC’s latest proposal for an "Intellectual 
Property" Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED2) goes beyond its previous Directive 
mandating national legislation for the prosecution of commercial copyright 
infringement as a felony. The new proposal calls for all forms of IPR infringement to 
be similarly prosecuted, and therefore would require criminal law punishment of the 
guilty, in addition to continuing to allow those whose property rights were infringed to 
seek remedies under civil law.
 3  The framers of this proposal appear to be 
committed to ensuring the sanctity of property rights, treating patents and other 
intellectual property as “absolute property” rather than a species of (conditional) 
economic subsidy that has been instituted to achieve desirable societal purposes 
through the promotion of invention and innovation. It is truly difficult think of any other 
single step in the patent regime’s evolution that could have more adverse effects on 
                                            
3 "Member States shall ensure that all intentional infringements of an intellectual property right on a 
commercial scale, and attempting, aiding or abetting and inciting such infringements, are treated as 
criminal offences." See Article 3, p.6 at com(2005)276. The first IPR Enforcement Directive was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers and promulgated last year as 2004/48/EC. For overview of recent 
enforcement initiatives, see http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/cooperation.html#specific.   - 11 -
the future vitality of technological innovation and long-term economic growth in 
Europe. This recommendation clearly passes the basic test for “policy fanaticism” – 
fanatics being people who, having lost sight of the original objective, redouble their 
efforts. 
Anyone even slightly acquainted with the modern realities of R&D-intensive 
industries should understand that business companies that compete by investing in 
new products and processes must take account of the economic risks of patent 
infringement suits. They make decisions that balance the latter against the costs of 
exhaustive patent searches among the exponentially growing volume of applications 
and awards; and against the risks of losing first-mover advantages by delaying 
development, production engineering and marketing investments until a 
comprehensive patent search can be completed. The prospect of criminal 
prosecutions for research managers and corporate executives that could be 
triggered by infringement suits would upset the present balance of such calculations. 
It would work to reduce R&D investment most notably in the more innovative small 
and medium size firms that have limited resources to devote to legal defenses, and 
fewer IP assets to deploy in counter-suits. Correspondingly, it would amplify the 
relative threat power of the large incumbent firms, especially those having extensive 
portfolios of un-worked patents. Companies that today sell software-based products 
and services often carry insurance to indemnify their customers and clients from the 
effects of potential infringement suits; their insurance premia would become 
unaffordable under the proposed legislation, even if their own executives were willing 
to risk being charged with a felony. 
The anti-competitive effects of this proposal therefore can be expected to yield 
adverse short-run consequences for consumers, because the pressure to hold profit-
margins below entry-inducing levels would have been lessened; and because the 
competitive entry based upon inventive activity would be specifically affected, 
consumers over the long-term too would lose the benefits of improvements in 
product quality stemming from inventions that were not commercialized because of 
the risk of infringement.
4   But, that is hardly the totality of the untoward 
consequences. Only a few years ago the European Commission was urging national 
governments to direct universities and other public research organizations to be 
more vigorous in patenting new discoveries and inventions and finding existing 
business firms, or launching start-up companies, to take exclusive patents that would 
protect the profitability of commercially exploiting the innovations.  Will the next 
mission for those institutions then be to carry out the exhaustive patent searches 
needed to guarantee the licensees that their business will not be shut down and their 
management prosecuted for criminal patent infringements, indeed, quite possibly 
infringements of another university’s patents?  The foregoing offers just a sample of 
the more immediately foreseeable generic implications of this latest ill-considered 
proposal. Could the proponents of IPRED2 not recognize that once the EU had taken 
the lead in criminalizing patent infringement, Europe’s entrepreneurial spirits would 
have been given yet another reason to decamp to the U.S. or other jurisdictions in 
                                            
4 Many other specific objections to the proposed directive, including legal obstacles to the 
harmonization of criminal law provisions across the EU member states, are presented in the 
European Consumers’ Union critique: BEUC/X/049/2005 (16 November 2005), available at: 
http://plone.ffii.org/Members/coordinator/BEUC%20Ipred2.pdf. 
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which infringement case continue to be dealt with under civil law? Indeed, in the U.S. 
the anti-competitive effects of the threat of infringement suits have prompted not only 
legal appeals against court injunctions, but also proposals to end mandatory 
injunctive relief for plaintiffs who bring suits alleging patent infringement.  
For the unfolding of this particular perilous scenario to be averted, it might be 
sufficient just for the European Parliament to be attuned to the concerns of 
consumers and the innovative small and medium size enterprises -- who are likely to 
be joined in protest by voices from the active libre (free and open source) software 
movement. But, rejection of this latest enforcement measure would in all likelihood 
provide only a temporary respite from the forces seeking greater security for patent 
monopolies.    If there is any prospect that a more balanced path will be found in the 
evolution of public policies affecting the operations of the patent system, it would 
seem to lie in the gradually growing segment of informed opinion on both side of the 
Atlantic that patent law and its enforcement are not simply arcane technical matters 
of interest to lawyers, patent brokers and the patent offices; that intellectual property 
rights should be viewed as part of the important regulatory functions of society; not 
as instantiations of  “natural” or God-given rights to enjoy a secure stream of 
economic rents from the commercial  exploitation of the results of creative and 
inventive activity. 
The effects of patents on market competition, on the costs of goods such as 
healthcare products and services, and on the conduct of basic, open science 
research in public sector research institutions, are coming under serious critical 
scrutiny now for the first time in several decades. Experts in the areas of science 
policy and anti-trust (competition policy) have begun to delineate the conditions 
under which it would better serve the public interest for courts to not grant injunctive 
relief to plaintiffs in infringement suits. They also are asking whether, in cases where 
commercial rivals settle an infringement suit before proceeding to litigation, a cross-
licensing agreement that restricts the licensee from marketing substitutes for the 
licensor’s own products should be respected as contracts of confidentiality.  Perhaps 
it would be better that all such agreements arising from IPR holders uses of legal 
protections examined by the competition authorities.  Similarly, science and 
technology policy analysts have been advocating some forms of exemption or 
compulsory licensing (on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms) of patented 
research tools, particularly when the inventions in question were the direct results of 
publicly funded research programs. The common principle underlying all these 
“reform” ideas is simply that patents are not just another form of property, but are 
legal monopolies created by society to achieve particular objectives; that their terms 
and conditions therefore should be set within the context of those societal goals and 
the principles and instruments of regulation that also address those and related 
purposes.  
Another straw blowing in the same wind is the explicit attention that now is being 
directed by external entities to the effects of administrative arrangements and 
practices in both national and regional patent offices.  For example, the National 
Academy of Sciences report
5 on the patent system in the United States has called 
                                            
5 National Academy of Sciences (2004) A Patent System for the 21st Century. Committee on 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy. Washington DC: National Research 
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for reforms in the way the USPTO operates, among them the introduction of an 
opposition system that would bring the American process more closely into line with 
European practice. These proposed reforms are likely to pit firms favouring reform, 
namely those in new industries and start-up companies that are especially 
dependent for financing on rapid and expert patent examination procedures, against 
opponents who better positioned to benefit under the existing system, particularly 
major companies with existing patent portfolios and large legal departments. But, if it 
succeeds, this reform movement could bring about considerable modifications in the 
U.S. patent regime that would have ripple effects internationally-- for example by 
narrowing the scope of patents, establishing an opposition process, and providing a 
basis for compulsory licensing to be triggered by the anti-trust (“competition”) 
authorities.  
The tensions created by opposing policy trajectories have appeared also in 
intellectual property domains other than patents. In regard to copyrights there is, as 
has been noted, an intensified legal enforcement campaign against digital piracy and 
investment in the development of technical encryption systems affording “self-help” 
to copyright owners – with backup sanctions against decryption being under the 
copyright statutes. But, concurrently one may observe the growing momentum 
behind experiments with “open access” on-line publishing, which already has 
become highly visible in the field of scientific and scholarly journals and pre-print 
repositories. 
When one turns to the field of databases, similarly divergent legal developments are 
in view. The sui generis database right -- promulgated by the EU Directive (March 
1996) for the legal protection of databases -- was recently re-confirmed with little 
public discussion, following a perfunctory European Commission review of the 
workings of the national laws mandated by its Directive.  On the other hand, the 
judgement handed down in November 2004 by the European Court of Justice in the 
infringement suit British Horseracing Board v William Hill 
6 (and also in a several 
related cases involving unauthorized extraction of database contents about football 
fixtures) surprised many legal observers by its restrictive interpretation of the 
protections available under the  law.  The assembling of content that was essentially 
incidental to, or a by-product of other activities, was held not to qualify as a 
substantial investment deserving protection. Further, repeated extraction of contents 
that did not enable the extracting party to replicate something approaching the full 
contents of the database also was held not to constitute infringement.
7   At the same 
                                            
6 ECJ Case c-203/02: Judgement of the Court (9.11.2004), See Official Journal of the European 
Union, c 6/4: 8.1.2005. 
7 The effect of EU adoption of the proposed directive (IPRED2) mandating criminal prosecutions for 
all forms of IPR infringement, obviously, would turn on the way that these and other ECJ’s rulings 
affected prosecutorial and judicial interpretations of the database right in the national jurisdictions.   
This is a matter of considerable complexity, and of important not only for the commercial database 
industry in Europe, but one that also could affect publicly funded scientific researchers who create 
new annotated databases by assembling un-copyrightable material from other collections, particularly 
in fields such as molecular biology, genomics and proteomics, where the resulting database contents 
can be licensed to commercial research firms. Although the matter lies outside the scope of the 
present remarks, I would venture to observe that the overall effect on such activities is likely to be a 
“chilling” one --especially given prevailing view (from the European Court of Justices)  that the 
database right is not  exhausted by the authorized extraction and publication of non-copyrightable 
contents, and the substantial uncertainties that still surround both of the extent of the “investment” that   - 14 -
time, across the Atlantic a much modified database protection bill (H.R. 1815) that 
was sent to the Congress (after many years of Committee deliberations and 
negotiations) has not been able to move closer to being debated, let alone enacted. 
Here too it might be remarked that after some decades during which intellectual 
property experts in Europe looked askance at the more aggressive legislative and 
judicial positions that were being staked out for IPR-owner’s protection by the U.S., 
the pro-protection tide seems already to be ebbing on the western side of the Atlantic 
ocean just as it is reaching full flow in the EU. This lack of coordination simply adds 
to the difficulties of predicting the future trajectory of development for the “global IP 
regime” –by calling into question the very meaning of that conceptualization.  
 
Q. In terms of IPR and patents, what do you think are the most significant 
challenges to the formulation or enactment of policy? 
If we are talking about the formulation of IPR policies that would sustain innovation 
and human creativity over the long-run, and maximize the benefits derived from the 
resulting knowledge by the mass of humanity, then the challenges are many and 
deeply rooted.  
 A problematic aspect of the intellectual property regime that is not frequently  
discussed, and consequently  is not as salient as it should be in policymakers’ 
consciousness, is the relationship between copyright and patents, and the ways that 
the two regimes may interact with and reinforce each other. With that in mind, I have 
already taken the opportunity of commenting on this issue in regard to the protection 
of rights in computer software -- where the problem of distinct systems having 
overlapping application is well recognized. But, considering the situation more 
broadly, the degree to which legal specialization has reinforced a “balkanization” of 
concrete policy discussion is striking. Today we have national patent offices, and the 
EPO, and their legal advisors thinking exclusively about patents; WIPO thinking 
about copyright and patents, but separately from each other; and, similarly, national 
and international bodies that concern themselves with database rights as distinct 
from their effects when conjoined with the protections afforded by copyright statutes.  
Admittedly, a reluctance to conjoin discussion of the two subjects in the latter case  
may be reinforced by the obvious fact that the EU’s sui generis database Directive 
transgressed several widely accepted precepts that had been established for 
international conventions affecting copyright protection: it is hard to square the 
principles enshrined in the Berne Convention with an indefinitely renewable right, 
with protection against extraction of material that is already in the public domain 
(including non-copyrightable content), and with the  explicit disavowal of “national 
treatment” guarantees.   
The overall effect has been to render the process of policy in the field of intellectual 
property peculiarly ad hoc and, consequently prone to systemic incoherence. One 
symptom of this condition is the cascade of protections that have piled up around 
material that falls under copyright. Leaving aside the patentability of some 
copyrightable material (software), and the possibility of placing copyrighted content 
inside a protected database, the use of purely technological means of securing 
                                                                                                                                        
is necessary to qualify a database-owner for legal protection, and the frequency and volume of 
extractions from any single database that would be found to constitute infringement.  
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protection for copyright and non-copyrightable content have been reinforced by the 
EU Digital Copyright Directive, which mimics the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (1998) in criminalising production or distribution or use of de-cryption 
technologies. Presumably, in the 25 member states of the EU, and in the EFTA 
countries that have implemented the Database Directive (as well as candidate states 
for future accession to the Union), databases that contain copyrighted content, 
presumably, would also enjoy legal reinforcement for the protection of information by 
technical means.  This particular legislation—one of the few instances in history of 
legislating against possession of a  specific piece of non-lethal technology—is 
emblematic of the drift of IP policy away from the granting of temporary monopoly 
rights in order to achieve socially desirable ends, namely the encouragement of 
creativity in cultural and technological pursuits. It follows, instead, from the political 
endorsement of “absolute property” doctrines in the sphere of intellectual property:  
information possessed –in the sense of guarded against trespass while being made 
available for authorized use – is to be accorded the same status as real property as 
matter of principle, rather than on evidence that to do so has demonstrable efficacy 
in serving the needs of society. 
Perhaps the most striking manifestation of the transformation that has thus been 
brought about in contemporary policy thinking concerned with intellectual property 
protection is to be read in the conclusions that issued recently from the “evaluation” 
of the impacts of the EU Database Directive that was conducted by the European 
Commission--DG Internal Market and Services (as called for by the language of the 
Directive itself).
8  While the principle of requiring assessments of the efficacy of 
mandated legislation is an entirely commendable one –and, indeed, might well be 
applied more generally, even to the workings of existing patent laws -- the actual 
practice in this case has left a lot to be desired. The EC’s evaluation focused on two 
questions: firstly, whether the European database industry has had the intended 
positive effect of stimulating the production of databases in Europe in the period 
since 1998, when the Directive was implemented in national laws; secondly, whether 
members of the industry felt that their new, sui generis legal protections were on 
balance beneficial and should be retained. 
 
The findings on the former question will, perhaps, come as more of a surprise than 
the tenor of the opinions the EC evaluators received from beneficiaries of this 
legislation. Although, in the summary words of the report (Ibid., p. 6), “the ‘sui 
generis’ right [was]….introduced to stimulate the production of databases in Europe, 
the new instrument has had no proven impact on the production of databases” – 
either in absolute terms or in relationship to the U.S.
9  Nonetheless, of the 500 
                                            
8 Commission of the European Communities, "First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal 
Protection of Databases," DG Internal Market and Services Working Paper, Brussels. 12 December 
2005. http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf. 
9 The EC’s study (Ibid., pp. 20-24) reports that the number of Europe-based commercial databases 
listed for 2004 in The Gale Database Directory was no larger than it had been in 1998, and that in 
relation to the corresponding number of US databases it had decreased markedly: the EU:US ratio 
had been 1:2 in 1996, and was 1:3 in 2004.  Western Europe’s share in “global database production” 
(reckoned in terms of the number of entries, un-weighted by sales) was 24% in 2004, no higher than it 
had been in any year during 1992-95; whereas the corresponding share for the US was 68-69% 
throughout 1992-96, rising to 74% in 2004. These realities notwithstanding, according to the report 
(ibid., p.23):  “55% of the respondents to the Commission services' on-line survey believe that the 
introduction of ‘sui generis’ protection for ‘non-original’ databases has helped Europe to catch up with 
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business firms that were asked to fill out an online survey, more than half of the 100-
odd  industry members that responded believed (incorrectly) that the sui generis right 
had enabled the European database industry to “catch up with US database 
production.”  Be that as it may, the evaluators appear to have been impressed by the 
fact that this consultation had elicited “strong [industry] submissions arguing that ‘sui 
generis’ protection was crucial to the continued success of their activities.” 
 
On the basis of this evidence, the Commission’s report proceeds to offer conclusions 
that deserve quotation in extenso:  
 
 “At this stage, the evaluation concludes that repealing the Directive altogether or 
repealing the ‘sui generis’ right in isolation would probably lead to considerable 
resistance by the EU database industry which wishes to retain “sui generis” 
protection for factual compilations. While this resistance is not entirely based on 
empirical data (many factual compilations would, most likely, remain protected 
under the high standard of “originality” introduced by the Directive), this 
evaluation takes note of the fact that European publishers and database 
producers would prefer to retain the ‘sui generis’ protection in addition to and, in 
some instances, in parallel with copyright protection.” (Ibid., p. 6) 
 
“…. the Internal Market and Services Directorate General has received strong 
representations from the European publishing industry that ‘sui generis’ 
protection is crucial to the continued success of their activities.... In the opinion of 
respondents, the ‘sui generis’ right has brought about legal certainty, reduced the 
costs associated with the protection of databases, created more business 
opportunities and facilitated the marketing of databases. While this endorsement 
of the “sui generis” right is somewhat at odds with the continued success of US 
publishing and database production that thrives without ‘sui generis’ type 
protection, the attachment to the new right is a political reality that seems very 
true for Europe.” (Ibid., pp. 23-24) 
 
Faced with this very real “political reality”, the Commission announced it would open 
a further consultation with “the stakeholders,” inviting them to voice their preferences 
among four policy options: (1) repeal the whole directive, (2) withdraw the sui generis 
right, (3) amend the sui generis provisions, (4) maintain the status quo. The policy 
principle here seems clear enough: when you have created the reality of vested 
property interests, be sure to thoroughly consult the vested interests on what to do 
next. Given the foregoing set of options, is there anyone who seriously expects that 
consensus of the industry members who will volunteer their preferences, and the EC 
interim recommendations, will fail to support retaining the status quo? I’m ready to 
take that wager, and will give any odds.   
 
Unfortunately, the charade of “evaluating” the effects of granting new IPR protections 
by asking whether those who are given monopoly privileges wish to keep them is not 
the only perverse consequence of the retrograde drift into a policy that protects 
private (intellectual) property for its own sake, in the belief that assuring private 
profits for some segment of the economy must be a good thing for society as whole.  
Consider, as another case in point, the still more radical move against innovation 
and competitive entry that was entailed by the legislation adopted in the past decade 
which mandated criminal law prosecutions of individuals responsible for creating, 
distributing, or using decryption technologies that would defeat technological “self-
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help” devices that could be deployed by IPR owners.  Encryption, and “trusted 
systems” enable holders of data and information to act as “perfectly discriminating 
monopolists” – setting terms and conditions for prospective customers on an 
individual, “take it or leave it” basis (so-called one-sided contracting) that can extract 
the maximum economic surplus from each transaction.  Applied to databases in 
jurisdictions where legal protection of the sui generis database right is available, this 
mode of exploiting monopolies of “public goods” paradoxically can be continued for 
an indefinite period.  Thus, the recent concatenation of separately legislated 
provisions has brought about a further extension of the de facto duration of IPR 
protections, paralleling the historical trend towards longer and longer periods of de 
jure protection for the expression of ideas under copyright.  It seems only reasonable 
to expect that the growing disparity between the copyright and the patent regime in 
this regard soon will give rise proposals from interested parties to further lengthen 
the effective term of patent protections, either by means of patent extensions, or 
lower real marginal costs of renewals.  Perhaps, as a more politically intricate 
alternative, a statutory lengthening of patent life will be offered as part of a coalition-
cementing compromise with to reformers who seek to narrow the scope of individual 
patent awards.   
A more concrete challenge to the implementation of patent policy that deserves 
notice turns on the issue of the relationship between patent rights and the application 
of competition policy and anti-trust laws. A patent is an uncertain economic asset, 
the value of which is in large measure dependent on judicial interpretation and the 
nature of the litigation process in particular legal jurisdictions. Contractual 
agreements about licensing are the outcome of a private process, and patent 
licenses are essentially a property contract between two agents setting out terms 
under which they enjoy the use of their respective property rights. But competition 
law regulates economic activities by intervening into the sphere of business 
contracting, and viewed from that perspective is only one among many such 
interventions that are justified as being economically and socially beneficial.  There 
are many instances of conditions being inserted in 'shrink-wrap', or 'browse-wrap' 
licenses that provide for the uncompensated withdrawal of the purchaser’s access to 
the product or service if she utters public criticism of the vendor or the product. This 
may be construed as one among many other kinds of conditions of sale, or licensing 
that are potentially anti-competitive. While these issues do not involve the patent 
itself, the value of the patent “option” depends upon the features of the larger system 
within which they are created and used.  The question is whether the welfare of the 
public can be served best by public regulation of those terms, rather than treating the 
patent as a private asset over which economic agents should be maximally free to 
contract.  
Another connection between competition policy and patent policy arises where the 
adverse effects of the distribution of patent rights would be mitigated by the 
formation of “patent pools”, a form of cartel. The system level conflict between the 
two policy spheres has become more serious as patenting as moved into new areas 
of inventive activity, particularly genomics and software. But there is a potential for 
this issue to arise more generally where-ever innovation involves complex devices 
that require a bundle of complementary technological sub-systems.  When bundles 
of rights are widely distributed, there is a potential for them to form a “patent thicket”: 
each IP owner acts independently in sets a price (a licensing fee) for the use of her 
patent as if it was the “last piece of the puzzle”. The best case result of working one’s   - 18 -
way through the thicket is to emerge “bleeding” from many small cuts: if it proves 
possible to negotiate all the requisite licenses, the entrepreneur will have incurred a 
large number of individually modest royalty charges (or up-front payments) whose 
collective effect is to greatly reduce the expected profitability of the innovative 
project, or so raise its costs as to tightly restrict the number of customers that benefit 
from its adoption. The result in these conditions can be even worse than that which 
would arise were all the IP rights to be monopolised by a single owner.
10  
An alternative analogy may be drawn with the old system of European toll roads, in 
which every principality levied a fee for passage, with the net result that prospective 
travellers start to question whether the journey is worthwhile—but there is no single 
agent with whom they are able bargain for a charge that would still make the trip 
worthwhile. The collective outcome is therefore particularly socially inefficient, and 
because it may result in many potentially buyer’s being discouraged, it could 
ultimately be less profitable for the individual owners of the intellectual property as 
well. This is a form of “coordination failure” which comes about because of the way 
that the patent system distributed property rights, and it may be exacerbated by 
competition policies that restrain or punish attempts to arrange cartel-like 
agreements for the joint ownership and sale of bundles of products or services.  
I am particularly concerned about the effect of patent thickets, and royalty stacking in 
the case of copyrights, upon scientific research activities, and especially on 
exploratory science. Modern science is by its nature intrinsically an open process, 
based on collective production of reliable (tested) knowledge. Yet, maintaining the 
sharing of information that is the touchstone of “open science” is becoming 
increasingly difficult. Society has got to where we are today by a long process that 
began in the 17
th Century, when a new collective set of attitudes pursued both 
knowledge and its distribution through competition among scientists for reputational 
standing based on disclosures of new discoveries. This led to the advance of 
technology on new and more reliable scientific foundations and extended the 
collaborative activity benefiting those who took the initiative. We appear to have 
forgotten the debt to that regime in our efforts to advance commercial innovation by 
providing individual contributors of new ideas or creative expressions with monopoly 
rights to exploit their specific contribution. Most useful ideas, and creative 
expressions build upon other ideas, and so require that inventors and users alike be 
able to access to other contributions; the demarcation lines drawn between ideas 
(and, one might add between musical compositions, and literary works), are rather 
arbitrary constructs that we require in order to designate discrete “contributions” so 
that the contributors can receive socially constructed rewards.  The latter 
“discretizing” approach, which is carried to an extreme by the efforts of the patent 
examiners to distinguished the novel aspect of an invention from the “prior art”, takes 
as its premise the necessity of providing people with incentives for an (inventive) act 
that is recognized to be of social utility. But there is an abundance of evidence that 
people are naturally inventive --albeit in different ways, some more socially beneficial 
than others. In reality, much creative initiative does not need to be induced, although, 
typically, the individuals involved must be supported in some way because significant 
amounts of time and material are required to achieve a practical implementation of a 
                                            
10 Refer to David, P. A and M. Spence, (2003) Towards Institutional Infrastructures for E-Science: The 
Scope of the Challenge. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute. Refer to 
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new idea, or a new expressive form. It seems necessary to remind policy-makers 
that the levels of compensation that would be sufficient to provide income 
maintenance and the wherewithal for inventive pursuits in question may not be at all 
proportionate to the socially value of the inventions that would result from those 
efforts. Yet, such is widely recognised to be the case in academic science.   
 
Q. If I had a crystal ball and you were able to ask a question about the future, 
what would your question be? 
Here is one question to which I would very much like to have the answer:  
Will the patent offices and public organisations embrace the mission of re-examining 
and restructuring the patent system so that it more fully fulfils the public purpose for 
which it was created? Or will it remain captured by industry and those in the legal 
profession who see the system of property rights as essentially self-validating, and 
therefore worthy of expansion and reinforcement without reference to analysis of 
alternative ways in which public purposes and individual economic welfare could be 
advanced?  
Yes, it is definitely rhetorical and a little provocative. But people were prepared to 
pose and debate such questions in the mid-nineteenth century “Patent Controversy,” 
which erupted during the heyday of the growth of industrial capitalism. The anti-
patent movement did succeed in the 1869 repeal of Netherlands’ patent system, and 
patents were only reintroduced there in 1911 after the Dutch found themselves under 
international pressure to match their support for the Berne Convention by also joining 
the Paris Convention. In the United Kingdom the patent system found many laissez-
faire critics, and leading economists who were more hostile to the granting of 
“artificial” (as distinguished from “natural”) monopolies.  Modern historians of this 
episode contend that Britain’s patent system, which in the early 1850’s was sorely in 
need of drastic reforms, was saved from repeal largely by the intervention of patent 
brokers, lawyers and others who had an immediate professional or business interest 
in its perpetuation, and undertook an effective public relations campaign on its 
behalf. Since then the West has not seen another such full-scale movement for the 
repeal of the patent system, and my question was not intended to reopen one here. 
Rather, it pointed to the desirability of asking how the system should evolve if it is to 
remain aligned to continue to serve the social objectives that hitherto justified its 
retention, given that the historical circumstances in which the present system 
crystallized are now being supplanted by a quite different economic context.  
There has been much talk in policy circles about the importance of adjusting our 
institutions to the requirements for successful performance of “the knowledge-driven 
economy,” in which new the generation of ideas and information will play a more 
central role than heretofore—especially in comparison with physical transformation 
processes such as are involved in the production and distribution of tangible 
commodities.  This would seem to call for a “re-think” of inherited presumptions 
about the economics of intellectual property institutions. Ideas and texts do not wear 
out with use, the incremental costs of using an idea is negligible, and it is hard, 
except under extreme conditions to stop its use for someone's own benefit. One 
might therefore take the view that the provision of information, as it has the 
properties of public goods, might be best managed through a system of public 
subsidization – like other forms of public utilities. Once upon a time, in the years 
between the First and Second World Wars, when public welfare and the Swedish   - 20 -
model of state intervention in the economy were politically fashionable in the 
Western democracies, this seemed the “natural” approach to take. Indeed, it strongly 
influenced the initial provision of public radio and television broadcasting 
infrastructures, along with public sector investments to provide systems of dams for 
irrigation, flood control, and hydro-electric power generation. 
But, perhaps due to the temporal coincidence between the accelerated development 
of digital information technologies and the ending of the Cold War marked by the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, pursuing that alternative to private enterprise 
investment to create the new technical infrastructure of “the information society” 
became politically out of the question. In their place we have what I have referred to 
as the quest for a system of “intellectual capitalism” based on the ideological 
conviction that anything capable of generating a positive private rate of return should 
be owned as private property in a system that allows property owners greatest liberty 
to decide how it should be exploited. Although this strikes me as a mistaken 
response to the enormous opportunities created by digital information technologies, 
considering the functional role of the ideological shift in public policy suggests a 
more materialist interpretation—if not an explanation of how it came about.  It has 
become obvious that the prospects of being able to extract significant profits from the 
business of transporting “bits” of information alone are vanishing; there are just too 
many alternative means of communication that permit the entry of competitors into 
that business. For the private sector to finance the infrastructure required for 
computer-mediated telecommunications, the solution being promoted today is the 
provision of a stronger legal-institutional infrastructure for business models that 
combine the distribution of “bit-streams” as services based upon control of the rights 
to use the intangible content. There is an aspect of absurdity in the present-day 
enthusiasm for erecting of monopolies that can extract profits from electronic 
content, and thereby raise economic barriers than replace the impediments to the 
sharing and wider re-use of information that the new digital technology infrastructure 
is intended to remove. 
Considering our present situation from that perspective, I want to close by 
suggesting one further, and rather more basic answer to the question that was posed 
(and addressed) in the previous section. Perhaps the fundamental source of the 
most difficult challenges to the formulation and implementation of sensible 
intellectual property policies today is the prevailing ideology which accepts private 
ownership of information content as the “natural” and only feasible foundation on 
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